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ABSTRACT
We investigate the medium-term determinants of the current account using a model that controls for
factors related to institutional development, with a goal of informing the recent debate over the
existence and relevance of the "savings glut." The economic environmental factors that we consider
are the degree of financial openness and the extent of legal development. We find that for industrial
countries, the government budget balance is an important determinant of the current account balance;
the budget balance coefficient is 0.21 in a specification controlling for institutional variables. More
interestingly, our empirical findings are not consistent with the argument that the more developed
financial markets are, the less saving a country undertakes. We find that this posited relationship is
applicable only for countries with highly developed legal systems and open financial markets. For
less developed countries and emerging market countries we usually find the reverse correlation;
greater financial development leads to higher savings. Furthermore, there is no evidence of "excess
domestic saving" in the Asian emerging market countries; rather they seem to have suffered from
depressed investment in the wake of the 1997 financial crises. We also find evidence that the more















1.  Introduction 
The enormous and rapidly widening U.S. current account deficit has been the topic of 
intense debate in academic and policy circles. As shown in Figure 1, the 2004 ratio of 5.7 
percentage points of GDP is high by historical standards, and as documented by Edwards, 
high in comparison to other developed economies. Mussa (2004) calculates that a sustained 
current account deficit of 5% – about a percentage point less than the level projected for 2005 
– will result in a net foreign liabilities position of 100% of GDP.  
A number of explanations have been forwarded for the recent widening of the U.S. 
current account deficit. Roughly speaking, the arguments can be categorized as either 
domestic or international in nature. Some argue that the main reason for the increase in U.S. 
current account imbalances is the decline in U.S. savings, especially public sector savings, 
since 2002. In this “twin deficit” argument, the current administration’s expansionary fiscal 
policy bears the greatest blame. Greenspan (2005), Ferguson (2005) and others have, on the 
other hand, argued that the impact of fiscal policy on the current account balance is small.  
The “global savings glut” explanation has been expounded by Bernanke (2005), 
Clarida (2005a,b), and Hubbard (2005). This argument views excess saving from Asian 
emerging market countries, driven by rising savings and collapsing investment in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis (and to a lesser extent Europe), as the cause of the U.S. 
current account deficit. From this perspective, the U.S. external imbalance is a problem made 
overseas, and amenable to a solution only in the longer term, as better developed financial 
systems mitigate this excess savings problem. 
Surprisingly, despite the popularity of the savings conjecture in (American) policy 
circles, there has been surprisingly little empirical work that takes seriously the global savings 
glut theses.
1 In this paper, we remedy this deficiency by analyzing the determinants of current 
account balances for industrial and developing countries, while empirically controlling for 
differences in institutional environment across countries. The data set we employ covers a 
large and heterogeneous group of countries (117 countries) over a relatively long time span 
                                                 
1 One exception is Gruber and Kamin (2005). Roughly contemporaneously with us, they have written a paper 
closely related to this one. They examine different aspects of the “savings glut” and “Bretton Woods II” (Dooley, 
et al., 2005) hypotheses. General discussion of global savings and investment patterns is contained in IMF 
(2005), CBO (2005), Higgins (2005) and the Economist (2005).  
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(1971-2003).  
Our empirical approach relies upon the approach of Chinn and Prasad (2003). Their 
study provided a broad empirical characterization of the medium-term determinants of current 
account balances for a sample of industrial and developing countries from the perspective of 
longer-run saving-investment balances. This paper updates and extends their work by 
incorporating a potentially important factor identified by Bernanke (2005), namely the effect 
of legal and institutional development.
2  
Whether one takes the twin deficits or global savings glut argument, the effect of legal 
and institutional development cannot be dismissed a priori, although it clearly matters more in 
the latter case In addition to macroeconomic attributes such as the stage of development, 
demographic profile, and the government budget balance, the legal environment and the level 
of institutional development should be important control variables. After all, the extent of 
private saving and investment should depend upon how the returns from those activities are 
protected by these factors.  
This paper also devotes special attention to the effect of financial development, 
motivated by the argument that “financial deepening” is one of the important determinants of 
saving (e.g., Edwards, 1996). While we implement our analysis using a model that controls 
for financial deepening, part of the current account imbalances for the United States and other 
countries including emerging market countries in East Asia cannot be explained. We will 
investigate whether this discrepancy is explained by the development in equity markets. The 
focus on equity market development is also motivated by the argument that “the U.S. current 
account is …, in part, a reflection of a global excess of saving relative to profitable investment 
opportunities in the post-bubble world.” (Clarida, 2005a). 
The main findings are as follows. The budget balance is an important determinant of 
the current account balance for industrial countries; the coefficient for the budget balance 
variable is 0.21 in a model controlling for institutional variables. We also find that 
institutional development is an important determinant for the current account balance, but 
mainly for higher income countries, although it is important for both saving and investment 
determination. More importantly, our empirical findings are not consistent with the argument  
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that the more developed financial markets are, the less saving a country undertakes. For most 
of the less developed countries (LDCs) and emerging market group (EMG) countries, if there 
is, the reverse is true; more financial development leads to higher savings. Furthermore, there 
is no evidence of “excess domestic saving” in the Asian emerging market countries, though 
they seem to have suffered from lower investment during the post-crisis period. For the 
United States, our analysis suggests that it is a saving drought – not investment boom – that is 
contributing to the enlargement of current account deficits. We also find that for industrialized 
countries, the deterioration of the current account that is not predicted by our baseline model 
is associated with the recent boom in equity markets. 
 
2.  Data and Estimation 
2.1 Theoretical Issues and Variables of Interest  
2.1.1 Macro Variables 
  We base the choice of macroeconomic variables for this exercise on the discussion in 
Chinn and Prasad (2003).   
 
Net foreign assets to GDP ratio: From an intertemporal perspective, the stock of net foreign 
assets (NFA) serves as an important initial condition, given that the current account is the sum 
of the trade balance and the return on a country’s stock of NFA (or payment on its net foreign 
liabilities position). Alternatively, from a buffer stock savings perspective, higher levels of 
initial net foreign assets should be associated with subsequent lower current account balances. 
Government budget surplus to GDP ratio: A variety of models predict a positive relationship 
between government budget balances and current accounts over the medium term. In the 
absence of a full Ricardian offset via private saving, an increase in the government budget 
balance could lead to an increase in national saving. In developing economies, where a greater 
proportion of agents may be liquidity constrained, this relationship might be expected to be 
more pronounced.  
Relative income: The “stages of development” hypothesis for the balance of payments 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 See also Alfaro et al. (forthcoming) for an examination of capital flows and institutions.  
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suggests that countries, as they move from a low to an intermediate stage of development, 
typically import capital and, therefore, run current account deficits. As they reach an 
advanced stage of development, countries run current account surpluses in order to pay off 
accumulated external liabilities and also to export capital to less advanced economies.  
Demographics: The literature on the determinants of national saving has pointed to a number 
of additional “structural” determinants such as demographics. Masson et al. (1998) show that 
the dependency ratio is one of the key determinants of private saving.  
Uncertainty: Terms of trade volatility is another potential determinant of medium-term 
fluctuations in current accounts. Agents in economies that face more volatile terms of trade 
might save more for precautionary reasons in order to smooth their consumption streams in 
the face of volatile income flows.  
Trade Openness: Country characteristics that reflect macroeconomic policies could also be 
relevant for current account determination. The degree of openness to international trade 
could reflect policy choices, including tariff regimes.  
These macro data are drawn primarily from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and supplemented by the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World 
Economic Outlook database. Additional details are contained in the Data Appendix. 
 
2.1.2 Institutional Factors 
Financial Development/Deepening:  
Another determinant of saving [emphasized by Edwards (1995)] is “financial 
deepening,” usually proxied by the ratio of a monetary aggregate such as M2 to GDP. The 
traditional interpretation of this variable as a measure of the depth and sophistication of the 
financial system suggests that financial deepening could induce more saving. However, there 
is a contrasting view that more developed financial markets lessen the need for precautionary 
saving, and thereby lower the savings rate. Bernanke (2005) argues that greater financial 
development will remedy the global savings glut in the long run by inducing a decline in the 
savings rate in the emerging Asia. Relatedly, Clarida (2005) argues that the sophisticated 
equity markets in the U.S. absorb excess saving from all over the world, leading to higher 
current account deficits. Given these arguments, we believe that financial market development  
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must be taken seriously in any empirical examination.  
To measure financial development, we use private credit to GDP (PCGDP) – in 
contrast to Chinn and Prasad’s (2003)  use of  M2 to GDP – primarily for data availability 
reasons.
3 The PCGDP data are drawn from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2001). 
 
Financial Openness:  
How open a country is for cross-border financial transactions should also affect capital 
flows across countries, and thereby the current account. One critique of the global saving glut 
view focuses on the question of timing – why do excess saving is flow into U.S. financial 
markets now, and not earlier? A frequent refrain is that, especially for the East Asian 
economies, comprehensive financial liberalization policies have been implemented, and 
thereby allowing excess savings to flow into the U.S, and other countries with developed 
financial markets. Thus, the openness of financial markets should influence countries’ current 
account balances via the impact on saving and investment decisions.  
Our metric of financial openness is the Chinn-Ito (2005) index. This index is the first 
principle component of the binary variables pertaining to cross-border financial transactions 
based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Higher values of this index indicate 
greater financial openness. Greater detail about the construction of this index can be found in 
Chinn and Ito (2005).
4  
 
Legal variables:  
A society’s legal foundations and institutions define the context wherein financial 
transactions and economic decisions are made. This proposition can have implications along 
                                                 
3 One may think of equity market development and its measures. In fact, the dataset of Beck, et al. also contains 
data to measure the development in equity markets. They are, namely, stock market capitalization (SMKC), total 
value of stocks traded (SMTV), and stock market turn over ratio (SMTO). However, it is extremely difficult to 
rely upon these measures as measures of equity market development, because with these measures, one cannot 
distinguish between market bubble behavior and real market development. Therefore, we do not include equity 
market development measures in our estimation. However, we will still examine the effect of equity market 
development using these measures in a later subsection in the way that the aforementioned distinction is less of 
an issue. See subsection 4.3.  
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any number of dimensions. Whether the legal system clearly establishes law and order, 
minimizes corruption, or whether the administrative branch of the government protects 
property rights efficiently are all important determinants of the incentives to save and invest. 
Decisions by foreign residents will also be affected. 
We incorporate the effect of legal and institutional development by inclusion of the 
variable LEGAL, calculated as the first principal component of law and order (LAO), 
corruption (CORRUPT), and bureaucracy quality (BQ).
5 The data series are available for the 
period of 1984 through 1997, but are included in the regression as the period-average.
6  
Summary statistics of the legal variables are displayed in Table 1.
7 Variable definitions 
and data sources, along with the list of countries in the sample and country groupings, are 
presented in the Data Appendix. 
 
2.3  The Estimation Approach 
The sample for our analysis covers both industrial and developing countries. The 
underlying database has annual data for 21 industrial and 97 developing countries covering 
the period 1971-2003. We examine three variables – the current account balance, and its 
constituents, national saving, and investment, all expressed as a ratio to GDP.  
One potential problem with developing country data is the possibility of significant 
measurement error in annual data. To mitigate these concerns, and since our interest is 
primarily in medium-term rather than short-term variations in current accounts, we construct a 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 The data are updated to 2003 and cover more countries (163 countries) than what can be found in Chinn and 
Ito. The updated data are available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/.   
5 All of these indexes are available from the ICRG dataset, and are monthly series. Annual series are calculated 
as the annual average of the monthly series. Higher values indicate better conditions.  
6 In other words, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, i.e., they are time-
invariant. This is primarily due to data availability. The relative shortness of the time series of the ICRG 
variables makes it difficult to include these variables as panel data. As Wei (2000) discusses (in reference to the 
corruption indices in his paper), these types of institutional variables may exhibit some bias. In order to 
circumvent this issue, we use period averages. However, the inclusion of these variables as time-invariant factors 
do not pose a substantial problem for our analysis, since these characteristics represented by the 
legal/institutional variables are likely to change only very slowly. 
7 In the original series, KAOPEN and LEGAL series range between negative and positive values since they are 
the first principal components. However, in order to avoid the complexity of interpreting the estimated 
coefficients, these variables are adjusted such that the minimum value is zero, i.e., they range between zero and 
some positive values. See Table 1.  
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panel that contains non-overlapping 5-year averages of the data for each country.
8  This 
procedure also has the advantage of abstracting from short-run variations in current accounts 
and related variables, which are not of central interest.   
Because the economic environmental factors may affect the way in which financial 
development might affect saving and investment we include interaction involving these 
variables. Interactions between the financial development and legal variables (PCGDP times 
LEGAL), interactions between the financial development and financial openness variables 
(PCGDP times KAOPEN), and interactions between legal development and financial 
openness (LEGAL times KAOPEN). The financial and legal interaction effect is motivated by 
the conjecture that deepening financial markets might lead to higher saving rates, but the 
effect might be magnified under conditions of better developed legal institutions. 
Alternatively, if greater financial deepening leads to a lower saving rate or a lower investment 
rate, that effect could be mitigated when financial markets are equipped with highly 
developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the effect of financial openness 
on current account balances.  
 
3.  Empirical Results  
3.1. The Basic Specification 
We begin our investigation with a basic specification that excludes institutional 
variables [comparable to that used by Chinn and Prasad (2003)], thereby providing a point of 
comparison.
9 The estimation results are reported in Table 2. Since these results are sensitive 
to the inclusion of the African countries, we also report separate sets of results with and 
without the African countries included, both for the full sample and for the developing 
country sample. We also report separate results for an emerging market group that differs 
                                                 
8 The 2001-03 period has been compressed into one observation, and so represents only 3 years instead of the 
standard 5. 
9 We include the financial development variable, PCGDP, in the estimation as Chinn and Wei did, though they 
used M2 as a ratio to GDP. However, we omit the financial openness variable so as to heighten the distinction 
between the basic macro variables and the environmental factors. In Chinn and Prasad (2003), IMF’s AREAER 
dummies for current account and capital account restrictions (“k2” and “k3”) are used to capture effects of 
restrictions on external transactions. However, these variables turned out to be statistically weak in many 
regressions.  
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somewhat from the developing country sample.  
One interesting result shown in Table 2 is the significantly positive relationship between 
current account and government budget balances found for the industrialized countries group. 
This result differs from the results obtained in Chinn and Prasad (2003), who examined a 
shorter sample from 1971 to 1995. A one percentage point increase in the budget balance 
would lead to a 0.19 percentage point increase in the current account balance for 
industrialized countries and 0.22 for less developed countries except for African countries. 
While significant, this is substantially less than the estimate obtained by Chinn and Prasad. 
We attribute this result partly to the differing sample (the estimate is also lower in the 1971-
1995 sample), but also to the difference in behavior of current account balances in recent 
years. 
We regress national saving and investment on the same set of regressors, and report 
the estimated budget balance coefficients in each of the regressions. The results show that the 
saving channel does indeed appear to be important in the sense that national saving and public 
saving are positively correlated, but only for countries with relatively higher income levels 
such as industrialized countries and emerging market countries. The budget balance appears 
to have opposite effects on investment between industrialized countries and less developed 
countries. This issue will be examined in greater detail in a later section. 
Estimated coefficients on the government budget balance (% of GDP)  
in the regressions without the institutions variables 
Dependent  All All  excl.  Industrial  Developing Developing Emerging 
variable:  countries Africa      excl.  Africa  Market 
Current account  0.144 0.190 0.189 0.158 0.223 0.155 
National saving  0.180 0.121 0.195 0.143 0.017  0.164 
Investment -0.030  0.004  0.166  -0.093  -0.094
13%  -0.067 
Bold figures denotes significant at the 10% level. 
 
One more noteworthy aspect of Table 2 relates to the financial deepening variable. In 
all subsamples, it exhibits a negative coefficient, albeit only statistically significant for the 
industrialized countries. Consequently, one can conclude that more developed financial 
markets do indeed lead to decreased current account balances, but not for the developing 
countries, as posited by the adherents of the global savings glut thesis.  
  9
 
3.2 Augmented Model with Institutional Variables 
We now augment the specification with variables aimed at capturing institutional factors, 
namely the legal development variable (LEGAL) and associated interaction terms. Tables 3-1 
through 3-3 display results from panel OLS regressions with institutional variables. Several 
notable results are obtained. 
First, inclusion of the institutional variable and interaction terms improves the fit of the 
model, which are observed with improved adjusted R-squared.
10 We also re-estimate the same 
regressions using each of the components of the LEGAL variables, namely, CORRUPT, BQ, 
and LAO, in order to isolate which variable drives the results. The test results (not reported) 
suggest that the corruption index is the most significant contributor among the three 
institutions variables, followed by the law and order index and bureaucracy quality in the 
order of significance.  
Table 3-1 also shows the regression results. Here again, the significantly positive 
relationship between current account and government budget balances is detected in all 
sample groups like in Table 2 where the regression was run without the legal variable and the 
interaction terms. The estimated coefficient is slightly higher for the LDC and ex-Africa LDC 
groups. The point estimate is a statistically significant 0.21 for the industrialized countries 
group, higher than in the previous estimation (0.19), which implies that the coefficient on the 
budget balance for the IDC group is robust to inclusion of institutional variables.  
The null hypothesis that the effect of budget balances on current account balances is 
zero is rejected, although in this particular specification the economic magnitude of the effect 
is not large (Note however that a ±2 standard error confidence interval encompasses values as 
high as 0.38).
11  
In their analysis, Gruber and Kamin (2005) obtain similar results. Using a smaller 
sample of 71 countries over the 1982-2003 period, they find that the budget balance has a 
                                                 
10 Between the models with and without institutional variables, the sample size changes. However, even when it 
is compared on the exactly same samples, the adjusted R-sq. is found to increase in the models with institutional 
variables compared to the ones without.  
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positive effect on the current account, albeit of a smaller magnitude (0.09-0.14). Trade 
openness also exhibits a similar effect as in our estimates. Perhaps most importantly, they also 
find that their governance indicators (the Kaufmann et al. measure) induces a reduction in the 
current account balance.
12 These findings suggest that several of the key effects we have 
detected are robust. 
When the results across different country groups are compared, the model for the full 
sample or ex-Africa full sample seems to exhibit more significant coefficients. But we can 
also observe that the results are driven mainly by the group of industrialized countries. The 
results for the industrial countries’ group indicate that the higher the level of legal 
development or the more open financial markets are, the lower the current account balances 
tend to be.
13 This finding is consistent with an anecdotal view that economies with more 
developed institutional infrastructure and more open financial markets tend to attract greater 
foreign capital inflows and thus run current account deficits. However, we should note here 
that only the group of industrialized countries yields results consistent with such a view. 
Interestingly, while the same relationship is applicable to the less developed countries group, 
the effect of legal development is not observed for the ex-Africa LDC group, and furthermore, 
emerging market countries, to which this argument is often applied to, do not exhibit this 
characteristic. When the F-test is conducted to test the hypothesis that the institutional 
variable, the financial openness index, and their interaction terms are jointly zero, the null 
hypothesis is rejected significantly only for the group of industrialized countries and 
marginally for the emerging market countries group (with the p-value of 15%). The results 
also indicate that institutional development is an important determinant of current account 
balances only for higher income countries. 
Although Table 3-1 may not appear to provide promising results for the LDC, ex-
                                                                                                                                                          
11 This finding is very similar to the finding of Erceg et al. (2005) whose simulation results show the coefficient 
of the budget balance is around 0.20. The estimated coefficient on the budget balance found in the regressions 
with individual legal variables, i.e., CORRUPT, LAO, and BQ, ranges from 0.19 to 0.24. 
12 In their analysis, they include the change in growth rate, as well as dummy variables for financial crises. On 
the other hand, they omit measures of capital account openness, financial development as well as terms of trade 
variability. They also exclude interaction effects involving legal development, thus ruling out nonlinearities of 
this type.  
13 The significantly positive coefficient on the interaction term between financial openness and legal 
development may suggest that the effect of each factor is concave depending on the level of the other factor.  
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Africa LDC or EMG subsamples, it does not necessarily mean that the variables of our 
interest are unimportant for macroeconomic activity. Inspecting the results from the saving 
and investment regressions yields additional insights. Essentially, the insignificant results in 
the current account regressions are a reflection of offsetting effects in the saving and 
investment regressions, both of which in fact present more significant results (Tables 3-2 and 
3-3). Also, for these sets of regressions, the joint hypothesis for the institutional variables and 
their interaction terms is always rejected, suggesting that institutional development is 
important for saving and investment determination.  
The saving regression with the institutional variables shows that a one percentage 
point increase in the budget balance leads to a 0.29 percentage point increase in the national 
saving rate for industrialized countries. While the coefficient is found to be a significantly 
positive 0.13 for the LDC group, neither ex-Africa LDC or emerging market countries group 
has a significant coefficient on the budget balance. With these results, we can surmise that for 
the IDC group, the government budget balance has a non-Ricardian effect on the national 
saving rate, whereas for the ex-Africa LDC or EMG group, that is not the case.
14 
                                                 
14 Other studies also find non-Ricardian effects of the government budget balance on national savings such as De 
Mello, Kongstrud, and Price (2004) for 21 OECD countries, World Bank (2005) for 46 industrialized and 
emerging market countries, and Gale and Orszag (2004) for the United States. In these studies, the effect of the 
government budget balance on national savings ranges from 0.50 to 0.80 percent (i.e., the Ricardian offset in 
private savings ranges from 0.50 to 0.20 percent). Kormendi and Protopapadakis (2005), on the other hand, do 




Estimated coefficients on the government budget balance (% of GDP)  
in the regressions with the institutions variables 
Dependent  All All  excl.  Industrial DevelopingDeveloping  Emerging 
variable:  countries Africa      excl.  Africa  Market 
Current account  0.151   0.191   0.211   0.168   0.230   0.153  
National saving  0.188   0.125   0.287   0.126   -0.036   0.123  
Investment  -0.008   0.012   0.215   -0.089   -0.135   -0.103  
Bold figures denotes significant at the 10% level. 
 
In the investment regression, the estimated coefficient on the budget balance is 
significantly positive for the IDC group (0.22), and is significantly negative for the ex-Africa 
LDC groups (–0.14). There is a contrast between IDC and non-IDC countries in terms of how 
budget balances affect the level of investment. Given the estimated sign of the coefficient on 
the budget balance variable, industrialized countries’ public financing seems to crowd out 
investment.
15 For less developed countries, improving budget balances worsens investment, 
which means deficit spending usually crowd-in effects on investment among these countries. 
This is probably because the level of capital formation is already close to the steady state level 
among industrialized countries. 
The effect of financial development on saving and investment is noteworthy as well. 
The saving regression results show that financial development alone does not seem to have 
any significant effect on national savings for industrialized countries, but for non-IDC 
countries, financial development may lead to higher saving rates – PCGDP’s coefficient is 
significantly positive for the LDC and EMG groups.
16 Since the financial development 
variable (PCGDP) is interacted with other variables – the legal development measure 
(LEGAL) and the financial openness variable (KAOPEN) – we need to be careful about 
interpretation of the effect of financial development. Table 4 shows the total effect of a 10% 
point increase in PCGDP conditional on the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN (the latter as of 
                                                 
15 This is consistent with the non-Ricardian effect on national savings found in the saving regression. 
16 Although the coefficient on PCGDP is not significant for the ex-Africa LDC group, when the insignificant 
interaction terms between PCGDP and LEGAL and those between KAOPEN and PCGDP are removed from the 
model, the coefficient on the level term of PCGDP becomes significant with a large magnitude. The coefficient 
of the interaction term between PCGDP and LEGAL is significantly negative.   
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the 2001-03 period) – whether their levels are low 10 percentile, mean, or high 10 percentile 
in each subsample, IDC, LDC, and EMG. Panels A, B, and C show the total effect of financial 
development on current accounts, national savings, and investment, respectively. Although 
the regression results for the financial development level or its interactions are not uniformly 
significant, this exercise illustrates how the impact of financial development can vary with the 
level of legal development and financial development.
17 We focus our attention on the total 
effects on national savings and investment (Panels B and C).
18  
Panel B shows that, for less developed countries and emerging market countries, the 
effect of higher levels of financial development on national savings is smaller for economies 
with higher levels of legal development and more open financial markets. Interestingly, 
Bernanke’s prediction that the more developed financial markets are, the less saving a country 
undertakes seem to be validated only by industrialized countries with high levels of legal 
development and relatively closed financial markets, or emerging market countries with high 
levels of legal development regardless of the openness of financial markets. Especially among 
emerging market countries with high levels of legal development, the negative effect of 
financial development is particularly high (0.4 percentage points) if a country has open capital 
accounts, which appears to bolster Bernanke’s argument that more financial opening and 
financial development will solve the issue of the savings glut in emerging market countries, 
especially those in East Asia. Now the next question is, is this finding applicable to emerging 
market Asian countries?  
Panel A of Table 5 categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia depending on 
the level of legal development and financial openness. The matrix shows that only Hong 
Kong and Singapore are categorized as countries with highest tenth percentile legal 
development and highest tenth percentile financial openness, while many Asian EMG 
countries are categorized in the middle legal development groups. Panel B reports the total 
effects of a 10 percentage point increase in PCGDP on national savings and investment for 
                                                 
17 The regression results for the emerging market countries group are relatively more significant. Our discussions 
will be focused on this group of countries. 
18 The total effects on savings and investment do not add up to the total effect on current accounts, because the 
current account regressions account for the covariance of national savings and investment while simply adding 
two coefficients does not.  
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Asian EMG and three industrialized countries, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
using specific values for each country’s legal development and financial openness 
measures.
19,20 According to Panel B, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only countries for 
which financial development will cause a negative impact on national savings. Other 
countries will experience an increase in the ratio of national savings to GDP if financial 
markets develop further. Interestingly, for all the countries except for Singapore, financial 
development leads to expansion of investment, presumably because of improved credit 
conditions and financial intermediation which is supported by Panel C where the effect of 
financial development is generally higher among countries with low levels of legal 
development and more closed financial markets. Furthermore, the effect on investment 
exceeds that on national savings. Armed with these results, we conclude that financial 
development reduces the level of current account balances, especially for non-U.S. 
industrialized countries and Asian emerging market countries, but that effect is achieved, not 
through a reduction in savings rates, but through increased levels of investment.  
Lastly, it is interesting to compare the effect of financial opening between 
industrialized countries and emerging market countries. While more open financial markets 
leads to lower saving rates among industrialized countries, for emerging market countries 
financial opening can induce to higher rates of savings. Examination of the coefficient on 
financial openness in the current account regression indicates that higher levels of financial 
openness leads to greater capital inflows for industrialized countries, but not for less 
developed countries.  
In sum, these results present evidence against part of the argument that emerging 
market countries, especially those in East Asia, will experience lower rates of saving once 
these countries achieve higher levels of financial development and better developed legal 
infrastructure. Arguments based upon this thesis have inappropriately extended a 
characterization applicable for industrialized countries to less developed countries. 
 
                                                 
19 These countries are mainly composed of top 15 countries in terms of the amount of accumulated foreign 
reserves (excluding gold).  
20 All of the three IDCs belong to the category of middle-level legal development and most open financial 
markets in the matrix for industrialized countries (not reported).  
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4. Are the Current Account Imbalances of the Last Decade Atypical? 
We next ask whether the pattern of current account imbalances observed over the past 
decade is atypical. One way to examine the alignment of current account balances is to see the 
predicted values based on the estimation results. Figure 2 displays the implied current account 
balances for various countries along with 95% prediction intervals that are calculated using 
the estimation results shown in Table 3-1. Figure 2 indicates that the U.S. current account 
deviating from the predicted path in the 2001-03 period. Given that the 2001-03 observation 
is just outside the ±2 standard error band, this indicates that there is something omitted from 
our model. Similarly, Gruber and Kamin (2005) also find an unexplainable component in the 
most recent few years.  
 
4.1 Out-of-Sample Prediction of Current Account Balances 
Another way to explore this question is to conduct out-of-sample predictions for the 
1995-2000 and 2001-03 periods using the estimated coefficients from the regressions 
implemented over the 1975-95 time periods.
21 As in the previous section, we implement two 
models, one with only the Chinn-Prasad macro variables and the other augmented with 
institutional variables (legal development, financial openness, and the interaction terms). For 
industrialized countries, we use more recent data that are available from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook database.  
Figure 3 displays the predicted and actual values of current account balances, 
expressed as a proportion of GDP. The predicted values are calculated using the specifications 
with and without institutional variables. In Figure 3-1, we can see that actual U.S. current 
account deficits are larger in 2001-04 than what could be predicted using the pre-1995 
estimation results whether we use the model with or without institutional variables. The 
magnitude of the under-prediction for the 2001-04 period is about 1.7 percentage points and 
                                                 
21 Since the time fixed effects for the post-1995 time periods are not available, we use the average of the time 
effects for the 1975-1995 period. This exercise allows us to observe how much the actual current account 
balances in the post-1995 period differ from what could be predicted using the relationships that obtained up to 
1995. Generally, when we examine a subsample, the predicted values will be based on the estimation for that 
sample group. For example, the predicted values for the group of industrialized countries will be based on the 
(continued…)  
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2.5 percentage points based on the models with and without institutional variables, 
respectively (see below). From the figure, we can surmise that the deterioration of U.S. 
current accounts can be partly attributed to higher levels of U.S. budget deficits in the time 
period given the estimated coefficient on the budget balance in Tables 2 and 3-1. However, 
given the over-prediction of the current account balances (i.e., under-prediction of the current 
account deficits) for the country, there seem to be other factors contributing to the 
deterioration of the external balance. 
 
Prediction errors from the estimations with and without institutional variables (PPT) 
 
U.S. Germany Japan  ex-G3 
IDC 
ex-Africa 




w/out  inst.  vars.  -1.66 1.59 0.64 1.38 1.34 5.36 2.22 6.92 
w  inst.  vars. -2.49 1.32 0.78 0.51 1.13 5.61 2.07 7.19 
 
The other panels in Figure 3-1 exhibit an interesting contrast; Germany, Japan, and 
industrialized countries ex-G3 experienced better current account balances than what is 
predicted by the models, with the ex-G3 industrial countries under-prediction the most 
marked. 
We repeated the same exercise for the group of less developed countries with 
particular focus on Asian emerging market countries. Figure 3-2 shows the out-of-sample 
predictions for these countries, namely, ex-Africa LDCs, Asian emerging market countries 
excluding China, China, and Korea, based on the models with and without the institutional 
variables. These figures make it clear that Asian emerging market countries, not just China, 
are experiencing an unpredictably large amount of current account surplus. In the 2001-03 
period, the actual current account balance of China is higher than what the model predicts by 
more than 5 percentage point, while the Asian emerging market countries excluding China, on 
average, experienced better current account balances than model predictions by stunning 7 
                                                                                                                                                          
estimation results from the regressions for the subsample, and the predictions for non-industrialized countries 





4.2 U.S. Saving (Public) Drought vs. Asian Saving Glut? 
Today’s 700 billion dollar question is, where does the U.S. current account imbalance 
come from? The framework we rely upon allows us to examine the determinants of current 
account balances from the perspective of saving-investment balances. Now, we implement 
out-of-sample predictions again, but for national saving and investment in the post-1995 
period. Figure 4 shows the out-of-sample predictions for U.S. national saving and investment 
using the estimation model with the institutional variables (whose results are shown in Tables 
3-2 and 3-3). In these figures, we can see that the U.S. is experiencing “saving drought” rather 
than “investment boom,” which is driving the current account balance down. 
What about the question of where the unpredictably large current account surpluses of 
the emerging Asia come from? Figure 5 helps us figure out the answer to that question. From 
these figures, we can see that the Asian emerging market countries’ level of national saving is 
not as high as the model predicts in the post-1995 period. This result counters the global 
saving glut argument. On the other hand, when we examine East Asian investment behavior 
in the bottom of Figure 5, we observe that the investment rate has been considerably lower 
than predicted, especially since the 1996-2000 period. The resulting conclusion that East Asia 
is undergoing a investment drought is consistent with the findings of Higgins (2005). 
 
4.3 The U.S. Current Account Imbalance and the Equity Market 
Our findings indicate that there is an unexplained component of the U.S. deficit. Is this 
component attributable to excess savings flowing from East Asia? We believe that a domestic 
factor is at work. Hence, we investigate whether the remarkable behavior of the U.S. equity 
market has some explanatory power.  
Specifically, we examine the correlation between equity markets and the prediction 
                                                 
22 Gruber and Kamin (2005) associate these current account surpluses with the after-effects of financial crises. In 
this sense, there results are consistent with the precautionary motive for reserve accumulation identified by 
Aizenman and Lee (2005).   
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errors from the previous subsection.  
We consider three measures of the behavior of equity markets: stock market 
capitalization (SMKC), total value of stocks traded (SMTV), and stock market turn over ratio 
(SMTO), all drawn from Beck, et al.(2001). We view SMKC as a measure of the size of equity 
markets, SMTO as a measure of the activeness of equity markets, and SMTV as a variable 
incorporating both aspects. Hence, SMKC and to a lesser extent SMTV will capture bubble 
effects. Figure 6 shows that many countries, notably the United States and Asian EMG 
countries, experienced the enlargement of equity markets.
23 These variables are expressed as a 
ratio to the world average to capture the investors’ focus on relative market performance.
24  
In Figure 7, casual empiricism suggests a correlation between the stock market 
development measures and the prediction errors for industrialized countries (left column) and 
Asian emerging market countries (right) using two different stock market development 
measures, relative SMTV and relative SMTO.
25 In the figures for the IDC subsample, we 
observe that U.S stock market booms in the 1996-00 and 2001-03 coincides with model over-
prediction of the current account balance, i.e., the country experienced larger current account 
deficits than what the model predicted. For the group of Asian emerging market countries, the 
association between the prediction errors and stock market measures, no such correlation is 
obvious.  
Table 6 reports the results of regressing the prediction errors on the equity market 
measures. The regression is performed with the weights based on the ratio of GDP to world 
total (in current PPP). Regional dummies are included in the regression and since the 
prediction errors are made using the estimated coefficients from the regressions implemented 
over the 1975-95 time periods, the time fixed dummies for the 1996-2000 and 2001-03 
periods are included. When we measure equity market development using stock market total 
                                                 
23 This is also the reason why we decided not to include equity market development measures in our previous 
regressions. Inclusion of these measures may also cause multicollinearity since the model also includes the 
private credit creation variable.  
24 We also calculate five-year averages to make it consistent with prediction errors.  
25 Prediction errors are based on the estimation for the subsamples countries belong to. For example, the 
prediction errors for Thailand are calculated using the estimates from the regression for the EMG subsample, 
while those for Ireland are calculated using the IDC subsample’s estimates.  
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values or stock market capitalization, the association between the prediction errors and stock 
market development is significantly negative, i.e., the higher the level of equity market 
development is, the more likely it is for the regression model using the data up to 1995 to 
over-predict the current account balances (under-predict the deficits) in the post-1995 periods. 
In other words, countries with higher levels of equity market values (either measured as 
capitalization or traded value) tend to experience worsened current account balances than is 
predicted by the model. Figure 8 illustrates the out-of-sample prediction errors and their 
portions that can be explained by the relative SMTV for the U.S., Germany, Japan, the U.K., 
ex-G3 IDC, China, Korea, and ex-China Asian EMG in the 1996-2000 and 2001-04 periods. 
The prediction errors for the U.S. and the U.K. are well-explained by the stock market 
behavior while it cannot be observed in other countries and groups, suggesting that the effect 
of stock market performance was especially significant in these countries. 
We also regressed the prediction errors from the out-of-sample regressions for national 
savings and investment on the (relative) stock market development measures (not reported). 
The estimated coefficient on the stock market measures turned out to be significantly negative 
only for the saving regression with stock market total values. This result is consistent with the 
recent experience of the U.S. where the dot-com bubble encouraged consumption through 




4.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have investigated the medium-term determinants of the current 
account using a model that controls for institutional factors such as financial openness and 
legal development, with an aim to inform the recent debate over the source of and solution to 
the “global saving glut” that has thus far lacked empirical content. Our study addresses that 
gap. Given our motivation, we focused our study on the behavior of current accounts for the 
                                                 
26 See the discussion in Greenspan (2005b). The results are also consistent with Mann and Plück’s (forthcoming) 
findings. Using disaggregate U.S. trade data, they under-estimated the trade deficit during the recent period 
(continued…)  
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United States and emerging market countries in East Asia. 
We confirmed the results obtained by Chinn and Prasad (2003) that – for the 
industrialized countries – budget balances play an important role in the determination of 
current account balances. A one percentage point increase in the budget balance is found to 
raise the current account balance by 0.21 percentage point. While smaller than the coefficient 
implied by some macro models, the standard errors on the point estimate are sufficiently large 
so that one cannot rule out a coefficient as high as 0.40 at conventional significance levels. 
We also found evidence for such a correlation among non-IDC countries. This finding is 
robust to inclusion of institutional variables, although incorporating financial factors seems to 
matter more (in a statistical sense) for industrialized countries than less developed countries. 
Furthermore, we found evidence that the oft-claimed argument about the effect of financial 
and legal development as well as financial liberalization is only applicable to this group of 
countries. This suggests that the policy recommendations made by the global saving glut 
proponents have only a tenuous empirical basis insofar as they relate to East Asia.  
We also found that saving per se is not excessive among the East Asian emerging 
market countries. Rather, these countries have experienced a shortfall in investment. The 
United States, on the other hand, seems to be experiencing saving drought, including that in 
the public sector. Furthermore, current account behavior seems be related with equity market 
development, especially since the last few years of the 1990s. We conclude that the more a 
country’s equity market boomed, the more likely that country was to experience a 
deterioration of its current account. This last finding suggests that widening of the U.S. deficit 
over the last ten years is at least in part attributable to the run-up in stock prices at the turn of 
the millennium. It remains to be seen whether the real estate boom of the last several years 
has had an analogous effect on the current account deficit.    
                                                                                                                                                          
mostly because of under-prediction of consumer good and auto imports, components that were driven  by the 
budget deficit (caused by the income tax cuts) and the equity market and housing booms.  
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Data Appendix 
The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of different sources. We provide below 
a listing of the mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these 
variables and the source(s) from which the primary data for constructing these variables were 
taken. A listing of the countries in the final sample, along with the country groupings used in 
the analysis, is also provided below. For most countries, data were available from 1971 
through 2003. Taiwanese data are drawn from the Central Bank of China, ICSEAD, and 
ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries. 
   
Mnemonic Source*  Variable  description 
CAGDP  WDI  Current account to GDP ratio 
GOVBGDP  WDI, IFS  General government budget balance, ratio to GDP 
NFAGDP  LM, Sinn  Stock of net foreign assets, ratio to GDP 
RELY  WDI    Relative per capita income, adjusted by PPP exchange 
rates, Measured relative to the U.S., range (0 to 1) 
RELDEPY  WDI  Youth dependency ratio (relative to mean across all 
countries), Population under 15 / Population between 15 
and 65 
RELDEPO  WDI  Old dependency ratio (relative to mean across all 
countries), Population over 65 / Population between 15 
and 65 
YGRAVG  WDI  Average real GDP growth 
YGRSD  WDI  Standard deviation of GDP growth 
TOTSD  WDI  Standard deviation of terms of trade 
OPEN  WDI  Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of goods 
and nonfactor services to GDP 
PCGDP  BDL  Banking development, ratio of private credit to GDP 
SMTV  BDL  Equity market development, stock market total value as a 
ratio to GDP 
SMTO  BDL  Equity market development, stock market turnover 
K2  GM, AREAER  Capital controls on current account transactions 
K3  GM, AREAER  Capital controls on capital account transactions 
NSGDP  WDI  National saving, ratio to GDP 
LEGAL authors  calculation  General  level of legal development, 
first principal component of BQ, LAO, and CORRUPT. 
BQ ICRG  Quality  of  Bureaucracy 
LAO  ICRG  Law and order 
CORRUPT ICRG  Corruption  index 
KAOPEN  CI  Capital account openness 
 
* These are sources for basic data used to construct the corresponding variables. BDL: Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine; CI: Chinn and Ito (2005); GM: Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti 
(1998); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics; IMF: Other IMF databases; LM: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001); Sinn: Stefan Sinn 
(1990); and WDI: World Development Indicators.22 
  Cn  Country name  ldc  emg
1  612  Algeria  1  0 
2  311  Antigua and Barbuda  1  0 
3  213  Argentina  1  1 
4  193  Australia  0  0 
5  122  Austria  0  0 
6  313  Bahamas, The  1  0 
7  419  Bahrain  1  0 
8  513  Bangladesh  1  1 
9  316  Barbados  1  0 
10  638  Benin  1  0 
11  218  Bolivia  1  0 
12  616  Botswana  1  1 
13  223  Brazil  1  1 
14  748  Burkina Faso  1  0 
15  618  Burundi  1  0 
16  662  Cote d”Ivoire  1  1 
17  622  Cameroon  1  0 
18  156  Canada  0  0 
19  626  Central African Republic  1  0 
20  628  Chad  1  0 
21  228  Chile  1  1 
22  924  China  1  1 
23  233  Colombia  1  1 
24  634  Congo, Rep.  1  0 
25  238  Costa Rica  1  0 
26  423  Cyprus  1  0 
27  128  Denmark  0  0 
28  321  Dominica  1  0 
29  243  Dominican Rep.  1  0 
30  248  Ecuador  1  1 
31  469  Egypt  1  1 
32  253  El Salvador  1  0 
33  819  Fiji  1  0 
34  172  Finland  0  0 
35  132  France  0  0 
36  646  Gabon  1  0 
37  648  Gambia, The  1  0 
38  134  Germany  0  0 
39  652  Ghana  1  1 
40  174  Greece  0  1 
41  328  Grenada  1  0 
42  258  Guatemala  1  0 
43  336  Guyana  1  0 
44  263  Haiti  1  0 
45  268  Honduras  1  0 
46  944  Hungary  1  1 
47  176  Iceland  0  0 
48  534  India  1  1 
49  536  Indonesia  1  1 
50  178  Ireland  0  0 
51  436  Israel  1  1 
52  136  Italy  0  0 
53  343  Jamaica  1  1 
54  158  Japan  0  0 
55  439  Jordan  1  1 
56  664  Kenya  1  1 
57  542  Korea  1  1 
58  443  Kuwait  1  0 
59  666  Lesotho  1  0 
60  668  Liberia  1  0 
61  674  Madagascar  1  0 
62  676  Malawi  1  0 
63  548  Malaysia  1  1 
64  556  Maldives  1  0 
65  678  Mali  1  0 
66  181  Malta  1  0 
67  682  Mauritania  1  0 
68  684  Mauritius  1  1 
69  273  Mexico  1  1 
70  686  Morocco  1  1 
71  558  Nepal  1  0 
72  138  Netherlands  0  0 
73  196  New Zealand  0  0 
74  278  Nicaragua  1  0 
75  692  Niger  1  0 
76  694  Nigeria  1  1 
77  142  Norway  0  0 
78  449  Oman  1  0 
79  564  Pakistan  1  1 
80  283  Panama  1  0 
81  853  Papua New Guinea  1  0 
82  288  Paraguay  1  0 
83  293  Peru  1  1 
84  566  Philippines  1  1 
85  182  Portugal  0  1 
86  453  Qatar  1  0 
87  714  Rwanda  1  0 
88  456  Saudi Arabia  1  0 
89  722  Senegal  1  0 
90  718  Seychelles  1  0 
91  724  Sierra Leone  1  0 
92  576  Singapore  1  1 
93  813  Solomon Is.  1  0 
94  199  South Africa  1  1 
95  184  Spain  0  0 
96  524  Sri Lanka  1  1 
97  364  St. Vincent & the Grenadines  1  0 
98  732  Sudan  1  0 
99  366  Suriname  1  0 
100  734  Swaziland  1  0 
101  144  Sweden  0  0 
102  146  Switzerland  0  0 
103  528  Taiwan  1  1 
104  738  Tanzania  1  0 
105  578  Thailand  1  1 
106  742  Togo  1  0 
107  369  Trinidad and Tobago  1  1 
108  744  Tunisia  1  1 
109  186  Turkey  1  1 
110  746  Uganda  1  0 
111  466  UAE  1  0 
112  112  United Kingdom  0  0 
113  111  United States  0  0 
114  298  Uruguay  1  0 
115  299  Venezuela  1  1 
116  754  Zambia  1  0 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Legal Variables 
  Groups (# of countries) Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
  Full  (118)  3.08 1.60 0.00 6.50 
  ex-Africa Full (88)  3.41  1.65  0.13  6.50 
General level of   IDC (21)  5.75 0.76 4.07 6.50 
Legal development   LDC (97)  2.50  1.06  0.00  5.34 
(LEGAL)  ex-Africa LDC (67)  2.68  1.07  0.13  5.34 
  EMG  (42)  3.05 1.05 0.57 5.34 
  Full  (118)  2.13 1.09 0.00 4.00 
  ex-Africa Full (88)  2.36  1.08  0.00  4.00 
Bureaucracy  Quality  IDC  (21)  3.76 0.44 2.65 4.00 
(BQ)  LDC  (97)  1.78 0.84 0.00 3.66 
  ex-Africa LDC (67)  1.92  0.81  0.00  3.66 
  EMG  (42)  2.33 0.63 0.87 3.66 
  Full  (118)  3.63 1.28 1.00 6.00 
  ex-Africa Full (88)  3.91  1.29  1.33  6.00 
Law and Order  IDC (21)  5.59  0.58  3.85  6.00 
(LAO)  LDC  (97)  3.21 0.96 1.00 5.43 
  ex-Africa LDC (67)  3.39  0.96  1.33  5.43 
  EMG  (42)  3.45 1.02 1.33 5.43 
  Full  (118)  3.19 1.19 1.03 6.00 
  ex-Africa Full (88)  3.37  1.26  1.11  6.00 
Corruption index  IDC (21)  5.09  0.73  3.52  6.00 
(CORRUPT)  LDC  (97)  2.78 0.81 1.03 4.75 
  ex-Africa LDC (67)  2.83  0.83  1.11  4.75 
  EMG  (42)  3.08 0.86 1.11 4.57 
NOTES: Data are extracted from the ICRG dataset. LEGAL is the first principal component of 
BQ, LAO, and CORRUPT. The first eigenvector for LEGAL was found to be (BQ, LAO, 
CORRUPT)’ = (0.579, 0.574, 0.578)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is not driven by 
any particular component variable. All of the original variables are extracted from the ICRG 
dataset, and are monthly series. Annual series are calculated as the annual average of the monthly 
series.27 
Table 2: Current account regression without institutions variable 
Dependent variable: 5-yr average of current account (% of GDP): 1975 – 2003 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Full  w/o  Africa  IDC  LDC  LDC w/o Africa EMG 
Gov’t budget balance  0.1442 0.1896  0.1889  0.1575  0.2232 0.1552 
  [0.0620]** [0.0533]***  [0.0799]**  [0.0780]**  [0.0767]*** [0.0728]** 
Lane’s NFA (initial)  0.0511 0.0686  0.0924  0.041  0.0576 0.0329 
  [0.0097]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0125]*** [0.0149]*** [0.0111]***
Relative income  0.0095 -0.044  0.0331 0.0463 -0.0152 0.074 
  [0.0344] [0.0332]  [0.1340]  [0.0746]  [0.0710] [0.0656] 
Relative income squared  0.02 0.0497  -0.0038  -0.0142  0.0156  -0.0281 
  [0.0295] [0.0287]*  [0.0868]  [0.1231]  [0.1120]  [0.0966] 
Rel. dependency ratio (young)  -0.0333 -0.034  0.0156 -0.0337 -0.0295  -0.0213 
  [0.0130]** [0.0108]***  [0.0259]  [0.0176]*  [0.0137]**  [0.0157] 
Rel. dependency ratio (old)  -0.0228 -0.0125  -0.0057  -0.0236  -0.0087 -0.0395 
  [0.0109]** [0.0099]  [0.0171]  [0.0146]  [0.0119]  [0.0123]***
Financial deepening (PCGDP)  -0.0143 -0.0128  -0.0173  -0.0188  -0.0086  -0.017 
  [0.0081]* [0.0086]  [0.0106]*  [0.0143]  [0.0160]  [0.0153] 
TOT volatility  -0.0289 -0.0092  0.1146  -0.0409  -0.0262  -0.044 
  [0.0243] [0.0210]  [0.0573]**  [0.0287]  [0.0253] [0.0286] 
Avg. GDP growth  0.2106 0.2329 -0.6895 0.2916 0.3026 0.1867 
  [0.1725] [0.1698]  [0.4730]  [0.2144]  [0.2254] [0.2621] 
Trade openness  0.0071 0.0125  0.0323 -0.0006 0.0045 -0.0082 
  [0.0109] [0.0087]  [0.0107]***  [0.0135]  [0.0122] [0.0107] 
Oil exporting countries  0.0329  0.0252 – 0.0373  0.0328  0.0333 
  [0.0145]**  [0.0115]** – [0.0150]**  [0.0128]**  [0.0161]** 
Observations  423 329  129  294  200 191 
Adjusted R-squared  0.37 0.51  0.52  0.33  0.48 0.44 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown. 28 
Table 3-1: Current account regression with legal development (LEGAL) 
Dependent variable: 5-yr average of current account (% of GDP): 1975 – 2003 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Full  Full w/o 
Africa  IDC LDC  LDC w/o 
Africa  EMG 
Gov’t budget balance  0.1508  0.1906 0.2113 0.1683 0.2301 0.1525 
  [0.0587]**  [0.0546]*** [0.0869]**  [0.0739]** [0.0753]*** [0.0749]** 
Lane's NFA (initial)  0.053 0.0682 0.1003 0.0433 0.0558 0.0396 
  [0.0105]***  [0.0104]*** [0.0176]*** [0.0134]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0115]***
Relative income  0.047 -0.0386 0.0098 0.0669 -0.0131  0.0721 
  [0.0426]  [0.0384] [0.1838] [0.0838] [0.0763] [0.0741] 
Relative income squared  -0.0025 0.0477  0.0064  -0.0004  0.0347 -0.0157 
  [0.0354]  [0.0331] [0.1177] [0.1357] [0.1249] [0.1081] 
Rel. dependency ratio (young)  -0.039 -0.0387  -0.003  -0.0415 -0.0383  -0.0306 
  [0.0134]*** [0.0110]***  [0.0252]  [0.0204]**  [0.0159]**  [0.0160]* 
Rel. dependency ratio (old)  -0.0218 -0.0122  0.0088  -0.0252  -0.0071 -0.0375 
  [0.0108]** [0.0106]  [0.0220]  [0.0144]*  [0.0129]  [0.0121]***
Financial Develop. (PCGDP)  -0.0231  -0.0027 -0.0084 -0.0366 -0.0244 0.0519 
  [0.0252]  [0.0259] [0.0767] [0.0514] [0.0532] [0.0495] 
Legal development (LEGAL)  -0.0099  -0.0065  -0.0208 -0.01 -0.0073  0.0041 
  [0.0037]*** [0.0035]*  [0.0099]**  [0.0048]**  [0.0048]  [0.0066] 
PCGDP x LEGAL  0.0058 0.0018 -0.0002 0.0024 0.0001 -0.0196 
  [0.0051]  [0.0051] [0.0136] [0.0147] [0.0161] [0.0124] 
Financial open. (KAOPEN)  -0.0049  -0.0058 -0.0529 -0.0089 -0.0082 0.0009 
  [0.0031] [0.0030]*  [0.0217]**  [0.0048]* [0.0048]* [0.0056] 
KAOPEN x LEGAL  0.0015  0.0019 0.0101 0.0019 0.0015  -0.0015 
  [0.0010] [0.0009]**  [0.0035]*** [0.0023]  [0.0021]  [0.0025] 
KAOPEN x PCGDP  -0.0063 -0.0065  -0.0038  0.0095  0.0084  0 
  [0.0050]  [0.0051] [0.0069] [0.0104] [0.0100] [0.0079] 
TOT volatility  -0.0152 0.0021  0.1082  -0.0272 -0.0237 -0.0325 
  [0.0238] [0.0239] [0.0639]* [0.0269]  [0.0266] [0.0336] 
Avg. GDP growth  0.2788  0.1671 0.0526 0.3976 0.3968 0.1019 
  [0.1970] [0.2345]  [0.6044] [0.2338]* [0.2572] [0.2763] 
Trade openness  0.0098 0.0198  0.0199 -0.0077 0.0054 0.0099 
  [0.0108] [0.0087]**  [0.0155]  [0.0161]  [0.0125]  [0.0124] 
Oil exporting countries  0.0269  0.0224 – 0.0321  0.0355  0.0294 
  [0.0149]* [0.0131]*  –  [0.0158]**  [0.0143]** [0.0181] 
Observations  394  324 124 270 200 184 
Adjusted R-squared  0.42 0.5  0.55 0.39 0.48  0.46 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown.  
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Table 3-2: National saving regression with legal development (LEGAL) 
Dependent variable: 5-yr average of national saving (% of GDP): 1975 – 2003 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Full  Full w/o 
Africa  IDC LDC  LDC w/o 
Africa  EMG 
Gov't budget balance  0.1882 0.1249  0.2869  0.1259 -0.0357 0.1228 
  [0.0555]*** [0.0575]**  [0.0923]***  [0.0720]*  [0.0751]  [0.0869] 
Lane's NFA (initial)  0.0257 0.035  0.0384 0.0225 0.0304  0.01 
  [0.0087]*** [0.0111]***  [0.0295]  [0.0101]**  [0.0131]**  [0.0139] 
Relative income  0.1649 0.0015  0.1053  0.314  0.252  0.3804 
  [0.0595]*** [0.0691]  [0.3098]  [0.0960]***  [0.1238]**  [0.1171]***
Relative income squared  -0.0869 0.0237  -0.0665 -0.3739 -0.4331 -0.4237 
  [0.0493]* [0.0545]  [0.1902] [0.1681]**  [0.1927]**  [0.1909]** 
Rel. dependency ratio (young)  -0.1238  -0.1257 -0.1137 -0.1072 -0.0978 -0.0778 
  [0.0182]***  [0.0188]*** [0.0331]*** [0.0229]*** [0.0274]*** [0.0242]***
Rel. dependency ratio (old)  -0.0593  -0.0563 -0.0536 -0.0493 -0.0345 -0.0554 
  [0.0133]*** [0.0141]***  [0.0305]*  [0.0187]***  [0.0226]  [0.0189]***
Financial Develop. (PCGDP)  0.0376 0.071  0.1183 0.1232 0.0474  0.2144 
  [0.0349] [0.0355]**  [0.0905]  [0.0737]*  [0.0721]  [0.0699]***
Legal development (LEGAL)  -0.0041  -0.0001 -0.0084 -0.0014 -0.0063 0.0129 
  [0.0051]  [0.0054] [0.0110] [0.0066] [0.0075] [0.0097] 
PCGDP x LEGAL  0.0007 -0.0032 -0.0243 -0.0202  0.0034 -0.0503 
  [0.0060]  [0.0059] [0.0164] [0.0186] [0.0181]  [0.0203]** 
Financial open. (KAOPEN)  0.006  0.0031 -0.0761 0.0081 0.0073 0.0199 
  [0.0043] [0.0045]  [0.0205]***  [0.0061]  [0.0066]  [0.0081]** 
KAOPEN x LEGAL  -0.0023 -0.0013  0.0104  -0.0015  -0.0023 -0.0031 
  [0.0013]* [0.0013]  [0.0034]***  [0.0029]  [0.0030]  [0.0035] 
KAOPEN x PCGDP  -0.0053 -0.0072  0.0109  -0.0135  0.001  -0.0077 
  [0.0069]  [0.0069] [0.0103] [0.0124] [0.0120] [0.0112] 
TOT volatility  -0.0255 -0.008  0.3875 -0.0504 -0.0955  -0.2041 
  [0.0286] [0.0409]  [0.0831]***  [0.0360]  [0.0454]**  [0.0491]***
Avg. GDP growth  2.0412  1.6171 0.4746 2.1404 2.1589 2.2386 
  [0.2245]*** [0.2864]***  [0.7354]  [0.2665]***  [0.4256]*** [0.3076]***
Trade openness  0.0303 0.0261  0.0746  0.0243 -0.0004  -0.0257 
  [0.0116]*** [0.0114]**  [0.0212]***  [0.0159]  [0.0156]  [0.0196] 
Oil exporting countries  0.0898  0.0898 – 0.0936  0.1162  0.1004 
  [0.0224]***  [0.0264]*** – [0.0235]***  [0.0287]***  [0.0236]***
Observations  392  323 124 268 199 183 
Adjusted R-squared  0.58 0.53  0.48  0.6  0.59 0.65 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown.  
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Table 3-3: Investment regression with legal development (LEGAL) 
Dependent variable: 5-yr average of gross capital formation (% of GDP): 1975 – 2003 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Full  Full w/o 
Africa  IDC LDC  LDC w/o 
Africa  EMG 
Gov't budget balance  -0.0075 0.0117  0.215  -0.0888 -0.1351 -0.1033 
  [0.0489]  [0.0516] [0.0903]** [0.0650] [0.0636]** [0.0856] 
Lane's NFA (initial)  -0.0329  -0.0186 -0.0167 -0.0361  -0.022 -0.0264 
  [0.0075]*** [0.0100]*  [0.0142]  [0.0088]***  [0.0125]*  [0.0138]* 
Relative income  0.2014 0.143 -0.0687  0.2671  0.259  0.294 
  [0.0431]***  [0.0503]*** [0.1515] [0.0735]***  [0.0891]***  [0.0955]***
Relative income squared  -0.1358 -0.0966  0.0082  -0.2563  -0.2806 -0.3359 
  [0.0336]*** [0.0372]***  [0.0990]  [0.1369]*  [0.1590]*  [0.1579]** 
Rel. dependency ratio (young) -0.0572 -0.074  -0.1226 -0.0331 -0.0503 -0.0266 
  [0.0175]*** [0.0168]***  [0.0241]***  [0.0219]  [0.0233]**  [0.0247] 
Rel. dependency ratio (old)  -0.0221 -0.0459  -0.0729  0.0043  -0.0199 0.0051 
  [0.0120]* [0.0126]***  [0.0178]***  [0.0153]  [0.0178]  [0.0176] 
Financial Develop. (PCGDP)  0.0832 0.086  0.1353 0.1732 0.0993 0.1869 
  [0.0289]***  [0.0316]*** [0.0763]* [0.0585]*** [0.0580]* [0.0689]***
Legal development (LEGAL)  0.0023 0.0071  0.0175  0.003  -0.0004 0.0119 
  [0.0045]  [0.0048] [0.0118] [0.0057] [0.0064] [0.0091] 
PCGDP x LEGAL  -0.0053 -0.0061  -0.02  -0.0238  -0.0072 -0.0334 
  [0.0054] [0.0056] [0.0116]* [0.0146]  [0.0146] [0.0185]* 
Financial Open. (KAOPEN)  0.0104  0.0079 -0.013 0.0132 0.0097  0.0253 
  [0.0037]***  [0.0037]** [0.0162] [0.0055]**  [0.0056]*  [0.0075]***
KAOPEN x LEGAL  -0.0032 -0.0031  -0.0006  -0.002  -0.002  -0.0056 
  [0.0011]***  [0.0010]***  [0.0026] [0.0024] [0.0025]  [0.0031]* 
KAOPEN x PCGDP  -0.0035 -0.0033  0.0053  -0.0237  -0.0131 -0.0034 
  [0.0055]  [0.0056]  [0.0069] [0.0117]** [0.0115]  [0.0110] 
TOT volatility  0.0123 0.029  0.2054 0.0113 -0.001  -0.1007 
  [0.0220]  [0.0276] [0.0524]*** [0.0255]  [0.0311] [0.0389]** 
Avg. GDP growth  2.0608  1.5594 0.7276 2.2295 2.0312 2.0779 
  [0.2222]***  [0.2528]*** [0.5913] [0.2451]***  [0.3100]***  [0.3422]***
Trade Openness  0.0019  0.0041 0.0203 0.0095  0.004 -0.008 
  [0.0107]  [0.0096] [0.0152] [0.0152] [0.0158] [0.0181] 
Oil exporting countries  0.078 0.0555  –  0.0806 0.0724  0.0712 
  [0.0140]*** [0.0180]***  –  [0.0138]***  [0.0186]*** [0.0214]***
Observations  413  338 126 287 212 194 
Adjusted R-squared  0.56  0.54  0.68 0.6 0.57  0.59 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown. 
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Table 4: Total Effects of a 10% increase in Financial Development (PCGDP) 
conditional on legal development and financial openness
 
A. Current Account 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Industrialized countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.39) 
Low 
10 percentile (4.57)  -0.117 -0.207 -0.260 
Mean  




10 percentile (6.47)  -0.121 -0.211 -0.264 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Less developed countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.39) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.19)  -0.337 -0.194 0.080 
Mean  




10 percentile (3.81)  -0.275 -0.131 0.143 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Emerging market countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.11) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.19)  0.160 0.159 0.159 
Mean  




10 percentile (3.81)  -0.362 -0.362 -0.363 
 
 
B. National Saving 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Industrialized countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.39) 
Low 
10 percentile (4.57) 0.141 0.398 0.551 
Mean  




10 percentile (6.47) -0.320 -0.064 0.089 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Less developed countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.39) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.19)  0.991 0.786 0.398 
Mean  




10 percentile (3.81)  0.463 0.259 -0.130 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Emerging market countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.11) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.19)  1.222 1.113 0.906 
Mean  









KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Industrialized countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.39) 
Low 
10 percentile (4.57)  0.472 0.597 0.671 
Mean  




10 percentile (6.47)  0.093 0.217 0.292 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Less developed countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.39) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.19)  1.448 1.089 0.406 
Mean  




10 percentile (3.81)  0.826 0.467 -0.215 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.39] 
Emerging market countries  Low  





10 percentile  
(4.11) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.19)  1.257 1.209 1.117 
Mean  




10 percentile (3.81)  0.368 0.320 0.228 
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Table 5: Effect of Financial Development  
on Current accounts, Saving, and Investment 
 
A. Matrix for Emerging Asia 
KAOPEN   
Low (closed) 

































B. Effects of a 10% change in Financial Development (PCGDP)  
on Saving and Investment, IDC and Emerging Asia 
Country  Effect on Saving  Effect on Investment 
Japan 0.347  0.504 
Germany 0.249  0.423 
United Kingdom  0.243  0.418 
China 0.513  0.797 
Hong Kong SAR  -0.552  0.154 
India 0.578  0.840 
Indonesia 1.238  1.319 
Korea 0.186  0.597 
Malaysia 0.116  0.551 
Philippines 1.163 1.251 
Singapore -0.882  -0.065 
Thailand 0.256  0.644 
Ex-China East Asia  0.572  0.857 
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Table 6: Effect of Equity Market Development on the Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors 
Dependent variable: Out-of-sample prediction errors 
  (1) (2) (3) 
SMTV SMTO SMKC 
Equity Market Development  -0.0043  -0.0020  -0.0041 
 [0.0014]***  [0.0028]  [0.0019]** 
West  Hemisphere  -0.0017 -0.0116 -0.0085 
  [0.0075] [0.0076] [0.0075] 
Europe -0.002  -0.0052  -0.0045 
  [0.0069] [0.0076] [0.0074] 
Asia  0.0166 0.0153 0.0151 
 [0.0077]**  [0.0089]*  [0.0079]* 
Africa  0.0007 0.0033 0.0152 
  [0.0089] [0.0093] [0.0110] 
fix00  0.0061 0.0055 0.0051 
  [0.0051] [0.0052] [0.0047] 
fix03  0.0122 0.0096 0.0086 
 [0.0066]*  [0.0083]  [0.0081] 
Constant  0.0068 0.0059 0.0072 
  [0.0064] [0.0070] [0.0069] 
Observations  280 258 261 
Adjusted R-squared  0.26  0.24  0.26 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NOTE: The regression is performed with the weights based on the ratio of GDP in 
current PPP.   
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Figure 2: Implied current accounts
United States
period
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Figure 3-1: Out-of-sample predictions of current accounts with and without institutional variables, industrialized countries 
United States
period
 Current Account % of GDP  pred. value w/out inst. vars
 pred. value w/ inst. vars
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Industrialized countries excluding G3
period
 Average CA, IDC except G3  pred. value w/out inst. vars
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Figure 3-2: Out-of-sample predictions of current accounts with and without institutional variables, less developed countries 
LDC excluding African countries
period
 avg. CA for ex-Africa LDC  pred. value w/out inst. vars.
 pred. value w/ inst. vars.
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Figure 4: Out-of-sample predictions  
for U.S. national saving and investment  
U.S. National Saving
period
 Nat'l Saving % of GDP  Predicted Nat'l Saving
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Figure 5: Out-of-sample predictions for Emerging Asia’s 
national saving and investment (excluding China) 
Nat'l Saving of Emerging Asia excluding China
period
 avg. Nat'l Saving for ex-China   predicted value 










Investment of Emerging Asia excluding China
period
 avg. Investment for ex-China As  predicted value










Figure 6: Equity Market Development in Various Measures (SMTV, SMTO, and SMKC) 
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Figure 6: Equity Market Development in Various Measures (SMTV, SMTO, and SMKC) 








1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-'00 2001-03











1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-'00 2001-03

















1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-'00 2001-03


































































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5
Relative SMTV

























































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Relative SMTO
Prediction errors vs. relative SMTO, IDC
 






































































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Relative SMTV


































































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Relative SMTO
Prediction errors vs. relative SMTO, Asian EMG43 













1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04 1996-'00 2001-'04
Pr edi cti on err ors
Por t i on expl ai ned by  r el ati ve SMTV
Uni ted S tates




ex-Chi na Asi an EM G
 